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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JAc;:.: u .. ':;. .c. :=-:__ ,] f'.!OA

ex rel. THERESA BURR,

1

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 91-134-Civ-J-16

BLUE CROSS ANO BLUE SHIELD

OF FLORIDA, INC., etc.,
Defendant.

REPORT ANO

RECOMMEND~TION 1

status
This

cause

is before the Court on the Plaintiff,

United

States' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #66), filed on August 5, 1993, and
the

United

States'

Notwithstanding

Motion

for

court

Approval

of

settlement
filed

on

October 5, 1993 (hereinafter collectively Settlement Motions).

By

Objections

of

Relator

(Doc.

#87),

Order (Doc. #89) entered on October 6, 1993, the District court
referred the Settlement Motions to the undersigned ••to conduct a

hearing and to submit to this Court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations in accordance with 28

u.s.c. §636(b) and Local

6.0l(a) on the approval of the proposed settlement."

Rule

Id. at 2.

Pursuant to the District Court's instructions, a hearing on the
fairness, adequa~y, and reasonableness of the proposed settlemsnt

1 Specific, written objectiong may be filed in accordance with Rule 6.02,
Local Rules, United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, within
ten (10) days after service of this dccument. ?ailure to timely aerve objections
shall bar the party from a de novo determination by a district judge and from
attacking factual findings on appeal.
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was held on April 20-22, 1994.

proposed findings

On May 19, 1994, the parties filed

and conclusions.

or

Findings or Fact and Memorandum

See

Plaintiff's Proposed

Law in support or Motion for

Approval of Settlement (Doc. #193); Relator's Proposed Findings of

Fact and Memorandum of Law (Doc.
Memorandum) ;

#192)

Defendant Blue Cross and

(hereinafter Relator's

Blue Shield

of

Florida,

Inc.'s Proposed Conclusions of Law and Recoltllllendation (Doc. #191);
Defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.'s Proposed

Findings of Fact (Doc. #190); see also Defendant Blue cross and
Blue Shield of Florida Inc.'s Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law in

Support of Approval of ths Proposed Settlement (Doc. #189), filed

on May 19, 1994,.

lindings ot Faot
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the United
States Department of Heal th and Human Services is the federal

agency responsible tor administering the Medicare Part B program.
HCFA itself does not process claims for Medicare Part B benefits,
but contracts with private insurance companies, known as carriers,

to perform that function.

By law, carriers are compensated for the

cost of performing under their contract.

Thus, carriers neither

make a profit nor sustain a loss on their contracts with HCFA.
Since 1966,

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida,

Inc.

(hereinafter BCBSF) has been the carrier for the Medicare Part B
program

in

As

Florida.

responsibility

for

the

Florida

processing

all

carrier,

Medicare

ECBSF

Part

B

bears
claims

originating in the state of Florida, which amounts to approximately
2
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36 million claims annually.

BCBSF is said to be the second largest

Medicare Part B contractor in the nation.
For a number of years before the events at issue in this

lawsuit, BCBSF's claims processing operation was computerized.
particular, the automated process worked as follows. 2

A

claim

received through the mail room 3 was copied onto microfilm,
assigned an internal-control number {ICN).

In

and

The claim would then

be sorted and sent to an examiner to be entered into the computer
system.

After this was done, the claim itself as well as the

microfilm copy were put in storage.
system,

Once entered into the computer

the claim would do one of three things:

proceed directly

to

payment;

(2)

it

would

be

(1)

denied

it would
by

the

computer; or (3) it would suspend out of the system as a result of
an audit or edit, which were programs designed to identify claims

which may be unallowable in whole or in part.

If the

claim

suspended out of the system, it would be the responsibility of a

claims examiner to evaluate the claim and determine if it should
be paid and the amount that should be paid.

If it was determined

the claim should be paid in whole or in part, the audit or edit was

overridden by use of a "force code,

and the claim was permitted

11

to proceed to the next system location.
2 The explAnation in the text is somewhat oversimplified. For example,
claims apparently could be suspended by more than ona audit or edit,
necessitating a review of each of the grounds for which the claim was suspended.
The description in the text, however, is probably sufficient for purposes of
evaluating the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the settlement.

3 Claims were also received electronically.
explained in detail at tha hearing.

However, this process was not

3
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BCBSF, with HCFA's approval, contracts with another company
for the actual data processing system and services needed to
process the volume of Medicare Part B claims it receives.

providing

company

these

management contractor.

services

is

kno~n

as

the

The

facilities

Since the 1970s the facilities management

contractor for BCBSF was a company called Electronic Data Systems

corporation (hereinafter EDS).
HCFA

monitors

including

BCBSF,

the

performance

through

a

of

process

performance evaluation program

all

known

its

of

as

the

carriers,

contractor

This annual evaluation

(CPEP).

takes into account all aspects of a carrier's performance,

and

ranks each carrier against all the others in the Medicare program.
There were numerous factors that entered into a carrier's CPEP

score, but generally speaking, the CPEP program focused on five
areas:

(1)

claims processing in terms of both timeliness and

accuracy; (2) quality of service to the public; (3) adequacy of
safeguards taken to prevent fraud;

requirements were met; and

{5)

(4) how well HCFA's reporting

efficiency of the carrier's services

and whether it stayed within its budget.
One

of

the

ways

HCFA

obtains

data

for

evaluating

the

performance of carriers is a procedure by which government auditors
check a sample of the claims processed by the carrier to determine
the accuracy or the carrier's claims processing.

In particular,

a program,the specifications of which are set by HCFA, selects a
statistical sample of the claims processed by BCBSF,

sample

and this

is then manually audited by BCBSF end-of-line quality
4
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assurance employees.

Their findings are transmitted to HCFA, as

is a sub-sample of the claims previously selected for auditing.

HCFA auditors then audit the sub-sample, and compare their findings
with those of the end-of-line quality assurance workers.
,..OC!nli-C!
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According to Deborah Richardson Tucker, the supervisor

of end-of-line quality assurance during the relevant time period,

an error is graded more seriously if it is found by HCFA.
In or about November 1987,

initiated

a

bidding

process

subcontract designed to

BCBSF,

for

at the behest of HCFA,

facilities

the

open the process

management

to competitive bids.

Under this bidding process, a company who had not yet developed all
of the features of the system contained in its proposal could

nevertheless receive the same score as a company, like EDS, whose
system was already in place.
proposal

of

GTE

Data

As a result of this process,

Services,

Inc.

(hereinafter

GTEDS)

the
was

HCFA approved the selection of GTEDS in May 1988.

accepted.

The conversion from the EDS data processing system to the
GTEDS system was scheduled to occur no later than December 2, 1988,

the day the EDS subcontract was to expire.

Within days after GTEDS

was awarded the facilities management subcontract, however, BCBSF
formally

asked

EDS

February 28, 1989.
1994,

to

to

agree

its

subcontract

to

See Defendant Exhibit 35, filed on April 21,

EDS declined this request.

on April 21, 1994.

extend

See Defendant Exhibit 36, filed

consequently, BCBSF was faced with the prospect

of having to convert to a new facilities management subcontractor
5
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who did not yet have a

functioning system in a _period of six

months.
Before the new GTEDS system was brought on line, SCBSF created
an implementation team of employees to assist in the transition.
In

addition,

BCBSF

hired

and

trained hundreds

employees to assist in the conversion.

of

additional

In accordance with the

established schedule, the GTEDS system was brought on line over
Thanksgiving weekend, 1988.

Immediately after it was brought on line, problems developed
with the new GTEDS system.

or could not be used.

Features would not function properly

Claims, once evaluated by a claims examiner

and approved, would "loop" in the system rather than proceed to the

next system location.

With respect to those claims for which a

valid prescription was required,

the system was "dropping" the

prescriptions, resulting in these claims being suspended for lack

of a valid prescription.

These problems,

resolved quickly,

large backlog of unprocessed Medicare

and a

Part B claims began to accumulate.

by and large,

were not

BCBSF soon received numerous

complaints from physicians regarding payment of their claims.
Eventually,

inquiry was made by HCFA and members of the United

states Congress regarding why claims were not being paid in a

timely fashion.
Various measures were taken by BCBSF management and its

employees to deal with the backlog.

Employees worked many hours

of overtime, and workers were reassigned to assist claims examiners

in attempting to process the claims to reduce the backlog.

Later,

6
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claims

system,

instructed to force

e~aminers were

claims

through the

using the force codes, without conducting the required

manual raview of the appropriateness of the claim.

Claims that

could not be forced through the system were sent to a system

location which effectively meant they were deleted from the system.
Although these claims were to be re-ICNed and reentered into the
system,

it has been alleged many of these claims were simply

discarded without being reentered.

In some instances, for claims

requiring a prescription, but for which the system was unable to

retain a prescription, phony prescription information was added to
the claim to pennit it to process to payment.
In

addition,

system

audits

and

edits

including audits and edits mandated by HCFA.

instances,

HCFA-mandated audits

were

without the knowledge or approval of HCFA.

off,

In one or two

edits were

and/or

turned

turned off

To ensure the end-of-

line auditors were aware of those audits and edits which had been
turned off,

a flip-chart or list of such audits and edits was

posted in the end-of-line audit area.

The end-of-line auditors

were instructed to audit the claims as if all of the audits and

edits had been turned off, to ensure they would catch those errors
which would normally be intercepted by an audit or edit.
The Relater,

Theresa Burr, had been employed by BCBSF for

about nine years at the time of the transition from the EDS system
to the GTEDS system.

During and after the transition until she

left BCBSF,

assigned to work

Burr was

in the durable medical

7

r 8/ 8 =:~808

ISL

~0G

:~ ·;c,T

~

;~~G; : ~

tG - f G_;~

:2 :~

ll ~-\::;~\; -~\208S(): ,~.ct l.~S

equipment (DME) cl~itts processing area. 4

She was selected to be a

project leader over the DME section during the transition, and, on

at least one occasion, participated in the decision to turn an
audit off.

She also used force codes to process claims without

conducting the required review, and instructed others to do the
same..

Further, she personally deleted claims.

She eventually left

BCBSF in August of 1989.

About three weeks after she resigned, Burr, with the help of

an attorney, prepared an affidavit alleging she was instructed to
"delete a

large nu1n:ber of Medicare Part B claims from the GTE

system" in order to "reduce the Medicare Part B claims backlog and

demonstrate favorable claims
12, filed on April 21, 1994.
instructed to recommend

inventory levels." Defendant Exhibit
Her affidavit also alleged she was

resubmission of any claims that had been

deleted in the event a supplier or beneficiary inquired about such
a claim.
Burr's allegations led to a criminal investigation involving
the Office of the United states Attorney for the Middle District

of Florida, and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of HHS.
In February 1991, Burr initiated the instant action, pursuant to
the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C.
§

3729

et

seq.,

alleging various violations of the FCA.

Her

Complaint was filed under seal and remained so until April 1992,

i Durable medical equipment includes such things as wheelchairs, hospital

beds, walkera, and oxygen concentrators.
8
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when

United States

the

elected

to

intervene

and

take

over

prosecution of the case.
The Settlement Agreement at issue, see Plaintiff Exhibit Sa,

filed on April 20, 1994, is part of a three-way settlement between
the United States, GTEDS, and BCBS~4

Sc, filed on April 20, 1994.

see Plaintiff Exhibits Sb,

In exchange for a release of certain

specified civil claims, BCBSF has agreed, as part of the instant
settlement, to pay the United states the sum of $10 million.

In

addition, in settlement of its $15 million administrative claim
against HCFA for certain costs, BCBSF has agreed to accept the sum

of $4 million.

Plaintiff Exhibit ab at 3.

Finally, in settlement

of its claim against GTEDS for breach of its facilities management
subcontract, BCBSF has agreed to accept the sum of $9,520,091.00.

Plaintiff Exhibit Sc at 4.
conditional

made

upon

Settlement Agreement,

Each of the latter two settlements is

the

Court's

approval

of

the

instant

which is the agreement to which Relator

objects.
conclusions ot Law
Under the FCA, the United States must obtain Court approval

before dismissing a civil action brought by a qui tam relater.
31

u.s.c.

§

3730(c) (2) (A).

Similarly,

The Government may settle the action with the defendant
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating

the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that
the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable
under all the circumstances.
Id.

§

3730(c) (2) (B).

The

test mandated

by

this

section

is

identical to that applied by the courts in reviewing settlements
9
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United States ex rel. McCoy v. California

of class action claims.

Medical Review, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 143, 148 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citing
132 Cong. Rec. 29,322 (1986)).

A number of criteria have been identified as pertinent to the
fairness,

adequacy,

settlement.

and

reasonableness

of

a

class

action

For example, a leading treatise suggests the following

factors be considered:

1.

Likelihood of recovery, or likelihood of success

2.

Amount and nature of discovery or evidence

3.

Settlement terms and conditions

4.

Recommendations and experience of counsel

5.

Future expense and likely duration of litigation

6.

Recommendation of neutral parties, if any

7.

Number of objectors and nature of objections

a.

The presence of good faith and the absence of collusion

2 H. Newberg & A. Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, S 11.43 (3d ed.
1992).

The Eleventh Circuit has approved a similar set of factors

for consideration by the trial court when evaluating the fairness,
adequacy,
Hinton,

and
559

reasonableness of a settlement.

F.2d

1326,

1330-31

(5th

relevant to the proposed compromise; "
settlement;"

1977) 5

Cir.

following factors relevant, among others:

See Cotton v.
(finding

the

(l) "the facts and law
( 2)

"the

terms

of

the

( 3) "the judgment of experienced counsel for

the

5 The Eleventh Circuit has adoptQd aa binding precedent all decisions of
tha former Fifth Ci:cuit handed down prior to tha close of business on September
30, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Pri~hara, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th cir. 1981)
(en bane).

10
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(4) the

"overriding

public

interest

in

favor

of

settlement;" and (S) the "number of objectors .. and the "objections
raised."} ;

see

also

Leverso

v.

Southtrust

Bank

of

Al.,

Nat, l

Assoc., 18 F.3d 1527, 1530 n.6 (11th Cir. 1994) (outlining various
factors); Bennett v. Behring corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th cir.
1984)

(same).

In light of the evidence presented at the hearing on the
settlement,

the

Court

pertinent in this case:

considers

the

following

factors

most

(1) the likelihood the United States would

prevail at trial, and the range of possible recovery if the United
States did prevail at trial;

( 2)

the amount and nature of the

discovery conducted in the case;

( 3) future expense and likely

duration of further litigation in this case; (4) the terms of thQ
settlement Agreement; and (5) whether there is any evidence of

fraud or collusion in the negotiation of the Settlement Agreement.
After a general discussion of each of these factors, the Court will

consider the various objections raised by the Relater.
A.

Burden

or proof

Before proceeding to a consideration of these factors,

the

court must resolve a dispute between the parties as to which party
bear~ the burden of proof with regard to the fairness,

and reasonableness of the settlement Agreement.

adequacy,

The ordinary rule

in the class action context is the "[p)roponents of class action

settlements bear the burden of developing a record demonstrating
that the settlement distribution is fair, reasonable and adequate."

Holmes v. Continental can Co., 706 F. 2d 1144, 114 7 (11th Cir.
11
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The United States maintains, however, the Relater should

1983).

bear the burden of proving her objections should be sustained.

It

contends the Relater can meet this burden only by showing the

decision to enter into the Settlement Agreement was arbitrary and
capricious,

citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,

Inc.

v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
The United states' position on this issue is not well taken.

This is not a case where an agency of the government is construing
a statute it is charged with enforcing.

Rather, the United states

is, in substance, making a business decision.

Hence, this is not

a case of agency action within the meaning of the Volpe decision.
For this reason, the court does not believe this standard has any
application in the context of the settlement of a civil lawsuit,
even one involving the United States. 6
It

would

be

particularly

inappropriate

apply

to

such

a

standard of review in tha context of a qui tam action under the

FCA.

The 1986 amencL~ents to the FCA, among other things, were

intended

"to

enhance

government fraud."
(N.D.

Fla.

private

citizen

assistance

in

curbing

United states v. Hill, 676 F. Supp. 1158, 1167
Toward

1987),

that

end,

the

FCA,

as

amended:

6 Tha United States citea Unitad seaess v. City o~ Miami, 614 F.2d 1322
(5th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that deference is to be given to aettlements
entered into by tha united States Department of Justice. While that decision
contains language supporting that proposition, the caaa did not involve a claim
unde~ the FCA, and the court's holding appea.r$ to be limited to the unique
circumstancas prsBented cy that case. Sea id. at 1333. More important, this
opinion was superseded when the full Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en bane.
See United sea~es v. City of Mia.mi, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir . 1981) (en bane) (per
curiam).

12
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(1) explicitly allows the relater to remain a party to the action
even after the United States intervenes; (2) grants the relater the
opportunity to file objections to a proposed settlement, and to be

heard on those objections; and (3) makes any settlement of a qui
tam action opposed by the relater subject to approval by the Court

after a hearing.

See

31

U•S• C •

§

Clearly,

3 7 3 O ( c) •

"it was

Congress' intent that qui tam plaintiffs play an active role in
settlement hearings."

McCoy, 133 F.R.D. at 148.

This interpretation is supported by the legislative history
of

the

1986

amendments.

According

to

the

Senate

Judiciary

committee report on the amendments:
Subsection (c) (l) provides qui tam plaintiffs with a more
direct role not only in keeping abreast of the
Government's efforts and protecting his financial stake,
but also in acting as a check that the Government does
not neglect evidence, cause undu(e] delay, or drop the
false claims case without legitimate reason ••

Id. (quoting

s.

Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in

1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5290-91 (emphasis added)).

Imposing on the Relator the burden of proof--particularly the heavy
burden advocated by the United States--would clearly frustrate the
intent of congress that qui tam plaintirfs serve as a check on
neglect of FCA cases by government officials.

Only by requiring

the United states to come forward with reasons why the settlement
should be approved may the relater effectively serve the checking
function envisioned by Congress when it enacted the 1986 amendments
to the FCA.

Therefore, the Court declines to impose the burden of

proof on the Relater.

13
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The Relator, on tha other hand, contends the United_ States
should have the burden of proving the fairness of the Settlement
Agreement not simply by a preponderance of the evidence, but by
clear and convincing evidence, citing In re General Motors corp.

Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1126 n.JO
(hereinafter In

(7th Cir.)

re General Motors), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald

v. General Motors Corp., 444

u.s.

She relies on the

870 (1979).

fact neither she nor her attorneys were permitted to be present

during the settlement negotiations as supporting the imposition of
such a heightened burden.
The

Court is not convinced that In re General Motors is

applicable to the case at hand.

In that case, the Judicial Panel

on Multidistrict Litigation transferred seven actions pending in
various federal district courts to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial
The district court presiding over these proceedings

proceedings.
entered

an

order

appointing a

committee

of

six

represent the plaintiffs in all pretrial proceedings.

attorneys

to

One of these

attorneys participated in negotiations with the defendant without
the

consent of

counsel

for all named plaintiffs,

violation of tha district court's order.

in

apparent

The district court

declined to require the attorney to disclose the progress of the
negotiations or any agreements that had bean reached, and once a
settlement was reached, foreclosed discovery into the settlement
negotiations.

Further, the district court limited the objectors'

14
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examination of the attorney responsible at the hearing on the
fairness of the settlement.

In

this

directly

case,

by

contrast,

Relator

did

in this case,

in the negotiations

frequently by counsel for the United States.

not

participate

but was consulted

Her exclusion was not

in violation of any court order, and after a tentative settlement
she was given six weeks to evaluate the proposed

was reached,

settlement and discuss

United states.

it with various representatives of the

She was also offered access to computer tapes used

by the United States in making its damages calculation.

Moreover,

this court did not foreclose Relater from obtaining discovery
regarding the negotiations, but granted her a significant, although
limited, opportunity to conduct discovery before the hearing on the

settlement.

Finally, the court in no way limited her examination

of any witnesses at the hearing with rege1rd to the settlement
negotiations.

Accordingly, the holding of In re General Motors

er. Gautreaux v. Pierce,

does not apply herein.

690 F.2d 616, 630

{7th Cir. 1982).
Inasmuch as the standard outlined in§ J730(c)

for approval

of a qui tam lawsuit is the same as that applied by Courts in

evaluating class action settlements, Congress must have intended
for the courts to evaluate settlements in a qui tam action in the
same fashion as the courts historically have evaluated class action

settlements.

That

being

so,

the

Court

must

conclude

the

traditional rule that the proponent of a settlement bears the

15
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burden of proving the fairness of that settlement applies in this
case.

B.

Analysis

l•

The Likelihood of

factor

A key

Factors
Suoee,s and

of the Relevant

in

evaluating

Potential Recovery at Trial

the

fairness

of

a

proposed

settlement is a comparison between the settlement fund and the
likely results

of

a

successful trial.

Mashburn

v.

National

Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 660, 670 (M.D. Ala. 1988).

"(TJha

inquiry should focus upon the terms of the settlement.

The

settlement terms should be compared with the likely rewards the

(plaintiff] would have received following a successful trial of the
Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1330.

case."

In so doing, the Court must take

into account any factors which tend to suggest the United states
might not prevail in a trial on the merits.
at

987;

Mashburn,

Electric:: Co.,

684

680 F.

F.

Supp.

Supp.

at

1162,

See Bennett, 737 F.2d
Gravitt v.

671-72;

1164

(S.D.

Ohio 1988)

General
(holding

that settlement of qui tam action under the FCA "must be tested
with a view toward the Government's ability to prove allegations
by a preponderance of the evidence.").

Deterndning the likelihood of success involves weighing the
strengths of the Plaintiff's case and the potential recovery at
trial

against

settlement.

the

amount

Mashburn,

form

and

684

F.

of

Supp.

relie!
at

670.

offered

in

the

Mathematical

computations of these factors with precision are not required, and

the

court

should

not

attempt

to

decide

the

merits

of

the

Plaintiff's case; rather, the court's sole function is to "make a
16
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rational appraisal of the merits of the action in light of the

uncertainties of fact and law,
benefits sought are fair,

supra,

§

[and]

reasonable,

to determine whether the
and adequate."

Newberg,

11.44, at 11-100 (footnote omitted).

The principal allegation of the Amended complaint (Doc. #lo),

filed on July 10,

1992

(hereinafter Amended Complaint or A/C),

supporting the claim the Defendant is liable under the FCA is:
Beginning in 1988, defendant Florida Blue Cross, its
agents and employees, knowingly engaged in a scheme to
impair,
impede,
obstruct and defeat
the lawful
governmental runctions ot the Medicare program, and to
deprive the United States and HHS of the right to have
the Medicare Part B program administered in the State of
Florida honestly,
fairly and free from deceit,
corruption, and false and fraudulent statements and
claims.
Id.,
0

1

20.

It is alleged that,

as part of this scheme,

knowingly.. engaged in a variety of conduct.

presents its own challenges, however.

BCBSF

Each allegation

The following examples are

given to illustrate the difficulties the United states would face
in proving its case at trial.

Example 1:

BCBSF "instructed GTE, as well as
its own employees, to bypass or override
certain Medicare audits and edits that should
have been included in the processing of
Medicare Part B claims." A/C, ! 23.
It is undisputed audits and edits, including some mandated by
HCFA, were turned off at the direction of Charles Scott, the Vice

President of Medicare Part B for

Further,

BCBSF.

Mr.

Scott

testified he did not get approval from HCFA to do so. Carol Walton,
the

Director

of

the

Bureau

of

Programs

Operations

of

HCFA,

testified that, while BCBSF should not have turned off audits and
17
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edits mandated by HCFA,

she was sure it had been done by other

carriers, and the fact it happened would not affect her decision
to approve the Settlement Agreement.

Further, Tucker, the end-

of-line quality assurance supervisor, testified an error had a
greater impact if it was discovered by HCFA.

Thus, a reasonable

fact-finder might determine BCBSF itself gained nothing by turning

off audits and edits since this might adversely affect its quality
scores on CPEP, and might be persuaded it did so only in response
to the pressure it received to get claims paid.

As carol Walton

herself testified, BCBSF "had some incredibly difficult decisions''
to

make.

Transcript

(hereinafter Hearing

of

Evidentiary

Hearing

filed on May 9,

(4/20/94)),

(Doc.
1994,

#184)

at 228.

This suggests the United States may have difficulty proving BCBSF
knowingly acted to defraud the United States in turning off the
audits and edits.

Example 2:

BCBSF "knowingly created false and
for certain DME

fictitious prescriptions
claims." A/C, 1 24.

It is undisputed prescriptions were added to DME claims due

to the problems the system had with retaining prescriptions.
particular,

the

system

was

"dropping"

prescriptions,

preventing valid claims from processing to payment.

In

thereby

At least two

witnesses testified prescriptions were added only where the system
indicated a claim for the sama equipment had been paid for the
month before or after the month in question.

18
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Ms. Walton opined adding prescriptions t-0 claims "sounds :more
onerous than perhaps it was . "

Hearing (4/20/94)

at 228.

She

testified:

If what you have is a computer prescription file that is
not working right, if you have evidence that that claim

had been previously paid, which would indicate at one
time there had been a prescription, to recreate it is
actually something that contractors are doing today in
a CME transition. It's not onerous. It's trying to make
data files in one place match what apparently must have
existed at another tim~.
Id. at 228-29.

In light of Ms. Walton's testimony, it appears the
~

United States might have difficulty proving BCBSF knowingly acted
to defraud the

united states when its employees added prescriptions

~

to claims.

Example 3: BCBSF "made widespread use of what
are known as 'force codes' in the 'header' of

claim processing f orrns to bypass audits and
intended to prevent the payment of
ineligible, unallowable, or duplicate claims,
resulting in Medicare payment of claims
regardless
or
whether
such claims,
as
submitted,
satisfied
Medicare
coverage,
payment,
utilization
or
eligibility
guidelines." A/C, ,r 26.
edits

Ms. Burr does not deny there are legitimate uses for force

codes.

The testimony at the hearing suggested force codes are

appropriately used to override a particular audit or edit once a
claims examiner has reviewed the claim and determined the claim
should be paid.

The allegation appears to be BCESF examiners used

force codes to override audits or edits without conducting the

necessary review to determine whether the claim was proper.

In

that · regard, BCBSF does not deny force codes were used in this

~

fashion as a means to reduce the inventory of unprocessed claims.
19
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Using force codes to force claims through without review is

the functional equivalent of disabling an audit since the net
effect, at least with respect to the claim forced through, is the
Thus, the use of force codes also raises the question ot

same.

whether

BCBSF

acted

to

knowingly

defraud

the

United

states

Again, as with the disabling of HCFA-mandated audits,

government.

/

a reasonable fact-finder might conclude BCBSF did not act with the

requisite knowledge or intent, but acted simply in response to the

pressure to get claims paid.
Example 4:

..

BCBSF "denied or deleted certain

claims regardless of whether such claims, as
submitted, satisfied Medicare coverage rules,
regulations, or guidelines because the GTE
data-processing system could not timely,
efficiently
or
accurately
process
such
claims." A/C, 1 30.
Obviously, denying or deleting a claim does not result in an
overpayment.
aa

a

The alleged harm to the United States here is that,

result of denying or deleting claims,

such would be re-

submitted, thereby inflating BCBSF's administrative costs.
There was testimony a.t the hearing that claims--or, more

precisely,

the

data in the computer system regarding certain

claims--were deleted.

arbitrarily denied,
Ms.

Cathy

"·

Although Ms. Burr testified claims were also

this testimony was largely uncorroborated.

Asher Harrison acknowledged

claims

information

was

deleted with the intention the microfilm of the claim would be
pulled, and the claim re-entered into the system.
Burr

Even though Ms.

and Ms. Harrison related instances where lists of deleted

claims were simply discarded into the trash, this arguably could
20
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have been acts of one rogue employee who did so without approval
from her superiors.
management,

claims

Mr.

count

Even if it were done with approval from upper

Michael Cascone testified inflation of BCBSF's

would

not

necessarily

result

in

a

higher

cost

reimbursement by HCFA. 7
In addition to the problems with the United States' case noted
above,

BCBSF raises the argument the activity alleged in the

Amended Complaint does not constitute the presentment of a claim
for

payment

§ J729(a).

within the meaning of

the FCA.

See

:n u. s. c.

While no authority is cited for this proposition, it

has some persuasive force.

BCBSF does not itself present the

claims it allegedly wrongfully paid, but maraly processes claims

submitted by third parties.

Thus, an argument could be made that

even willful payment of these claims without regard to Medicare
guidelines v1ould not state a claim under the FCA.

Scates ex rel. Simmons v. smith, 629 F. Supp. 124, 126

See

United

(s.o.

Ala.

1985) (finding the complaint failed to state a claim under the FCA

because it did not allege, among other things, "a claim by the
dezendants against the united states" (emphasis added)) , 8

7 The court does not undertake tc analyze each and every allegation of the
Amandar:l complaint.
The a.hove examplea ara illustrative, however, of the
dif fi.culties the United states could fa.ee in prosecuting this case to a

successful conclusion.

a Of course, even if the wrongful payments themselves would not support
liability under the FCA, it could be argued 3CBSF's claims for reimbursement of
its costs would give rise to such liability to the extent it made any fraudulent
representations in connection ~ith obtaining such reimbursement.
However, it
was unclear, based on the evidence presented at tha hearing, whether BCBSF did
make false statements tc HCFA regar~ing its claims processing.
21
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Thus, it can be fairly argued the range of recovery should
start at zero,

The Rel a tor has given the Court no estimate

regarding the top end cf the range of recovery,

hearing or in her post-hearing submission.

either at the

tM

Her representation she

t

did not have access to sufficient evidence to provide such an

estimate, see Relator's Memorandum at 20, is not persuasive.

a letter to Assistant Attorney General Frank

w.

f

In

~

Hunger, Esq., dated

August 2, 1993, her then-attorney wrote:
(WJe have undertaken our own estimates of the possible
magnitude of the processing errors based on summary data
we obtained from HCFA documents. These data show that
the extent of the potential loss is enormous
approximately $900 million assuming comparable national
trends.

Defendant Exhibit 9, filed on April 21, 1994, subpart 4-15, at 7.
If Relator was in a position to estimate the potential loss tdn

months ago, before the lilllited discovery permitted by the Court was

conducted,

she

can

hardly

expect

Court

the

to

credit

her

for the sake of discussion,

the

representation she is unable to do so now.
In any event,

accepting,

exceptionally optimistic figure of $900 million as the top of the

t
f

range of recovery, the $10 million provided for in the Settlement

I

Agreement is still an adequate amount in light of all of the

K

Not only could the United States' case be somewhat

circumstances.

difficult to prove, it likely would be very expensive to marshal
the

evidence to do so .

already

has

spent

As outlined below,

$700,000

investigating

the United states
this

case,

which

presumably does not include the costs associated with obtaining

court

approval

of

the

If

settlement.

the

United

states'

22
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investigation really is as deficient as the Relater alleges, it
would require an even greater investment of resources to prepare
the case for trial.

Given these costs and the risk of no recovery,

it is entirely understandable the United states chose to accept a

sure $10 million rather than gamble on a more favorable outcome at
l

~!:_rial.

...

Of

coursa,

$10

million dollars

percent of $900 million.

is

only slightly o\rer one

However, this does not take into account

the $11 million BCBSF has agreed to forego on its administrative
claim for costs,
BCBSF.

nor does it. include overpayments recouped by

As outlined below,

Settlement Agreement in no way

the

relieves BCBSF of its obligation to continue to recoup overpayments
of benefits.
In addition, "there is no reason, at least in theory, why a
satisfactory settlement could not amount to a hundredth or even a
thousandth part of a single percent of the potential recovery."

City or Detroit v. Grinnell corp., 495 F.2d 448,

455

n.2 (2d Cir.

1974); see also Bennett, 737 F.2d at 987 n.9 (noting with approval
the district court's finding that a recovery consisting of only
5.6% of the potential recovery was fair and adequate).

Thus, the

fact the settlement amount is only a small percentage of the most
optimistic estimate of the potential recovery does not, ipso facto,
mandate the rejection of the Settlement Agreement.
must be remembered

Cotton,

559

F. 2d

0

Finally, it

compromise is the essence of a settlement."

at 1330.

In _light

of

the

factors

already

discussed, as well as those outlined below, the court finds the

.....
\
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settlement amount falls at a reasonable point within the range of

I

possible recovery.

The Amount and

2.

Nature of Discovery

settlement is

Another consideration relevant to whether a

fair,

adequate,

and

reasonable

is

whether the plaintiff has

conducted sufficient discovery to enable the court to evaluate the

strengths

(and

weaknesses)

of

reasonableness of the settlement.
11-101.

It

is

necessary

ticket

clear,
to

however,

the

its

claims,

and,

thus,

the

see Newberg, supra, § 11.45, at
"formal

bargaining

discovery

table.'"

In

is
re

not

'a

Chicken

Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Lit1g., 643 F.2d 195, 211 (5th cir.
1981)).

Indeed,

informal discovery often will achieve the same

results as formal discovery, and more efficiently.

Cotton, 559

F.2d at 1332.
The OIG investigation in the ~nstant case lasted over three
years, according to Special Agent Richard Todd.

of time,
eighty

During that period

between forty and fifty witnesses at BCBSF,

witnesses

in

filed

on

Exhibit 5,

all,

were

April 20,

interviewed.
1994.

See

and over

Plaintiff

responded

BCBSF

to

approximately forty to forty-five subpoenas, and in one return of
documents alone there were some 200,000 pages of records as well
as computer tapes containing data on millions

addition,

a

11

van full 11

of claims.

In

of microfilm was obtained from BCBSF.

Hearing (4/20/94) at 50.
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A list of all of the documents in the posssssion of the OIG
related to this case consists of over six pages and over eighty
entries, outlining thousands of pages of records obtained in the

course of the United states' investigation.
4, filed on April 20, 1994.

See Plaintiff EXhibit

Moreover, an inventory of computer

analyses was also prepared and consists of forty-two items.

See

Plainti!! Exhibit 6, filed on April 20, 1994.

Special Agent

Todd testified

a

query

on

an

interoffice

computer system designed to track the nu1nber of hours spent on

various tasks revealed government agents logged approximately 9, ooo
hours on this case, which amounts to about four and one-half staff
years.

He further testified that, multiplying these hours by a

cost factor for each year of the investigation, he determined the
investigation cost the OIG some $100,000.
In addition to the United States' three-year investigation,

Relater

was

permitted

concerning the

an

opportunity

to

conduct

discovery

issues raised by the Settlement Agreement.

In

particular, she was permitted two waves of interrogatories and
requests for documents, as well as an opportunity to conduct a
limited number of depositions.

Moreover, the Court heard nearly

three days of testimony, much of which consisted of testimony put
on by the Relator.

In sum, even though it may not be sufficiently prepared to go
to trial, the United States has obtained ample information through
its investigation to evaluate the appropriateness of settlement.
Additionally,

J

the parties nave provided a sufficient record on
25

88; ~~~'.Z8G8 15L

t OS

- ··~7~ ·x-ff

: ~~cZS : ~

fG - r.0- ,.~

r

2 l =:

llf\:;~~ '1\~CSS;""> : .\2 l\~S'

which

the

Court

can

evaluate

the

adequacy,

fairnesg,

and

reasonableness of the settlement.

oyration

Future Expense & Likely

3.

Further

of

Litigation

In evaluating the settlement, the Court must also weigh the

benefits

afforded

substantial

litigation.

the

by

expense

and

Settlement

Agreement

associated

delays

against

with

continued

See Warren v. City 0£ Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1060

(M .. D. Fla. 1988), arr'd, 893 F.2d 347 (11th Cir. 1989).

situations,

the

unless

the

settlement

is

clearly

"In most

inadequate,

its

acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive
litigation with uncertain results."
11-122;

see also cotton,

Newberg, supra,

§

11.so, at

559 F.2d at 1331 ..

This case is a classic example of the general rule just
The length of the united states' initial investigation and

stated.
its

cost to date

are

indicative of what would

result

Relator's preferred course of action were chosen.

if the

"

To conduct the

kind of investigation the Relater desires, the United States would
hava t~ invest hundreds of thousands of additional dollars and

thousands more investigators' hours over a period of months or even
years, all with no guarantee of recovering against the Defendant.
t

BCBSF is well represented in this case, and would appear to have
the

will

and

the

resources

necessary

to

this

def end

vigorously over an indefinite period of time.

\

lawsuit

Any recovery that

could be obtained likely would come only after several years of

motion practice,

a lengthy trial,

and,

in all

likelihood,

an
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appeal.

These factors weigh strongly in favor of the settlement

reached.

~-

Tons

of the Settlement

"The court must be assured that the settlement secures an
adequate advantage for the (plaintiff] in return for the surrender
of litigation rights against the defendants.

noncash

consideration

is

appropriate,

consideration is sufficient."

as

long

as

the

total

Newberg, supra, § 11.46, at 11-lOS

As noted previously, BCBSF has agreed,

to -106.

Cash as well as

as part of the

Settlement Agreement, to pay the United States the sum of $10

million.

In addition, BCBSF agrees to accept, in settlement of its

$15 million claim for administrative costs, the sum of $4 million.

Finally, BCBSF agrees its costs incurred during the coursQ of the
government's investigation and in the course of def ending and
settling the instant action will be treated as "unallowable coats

Plaintiff Exhibit aa, 1 9 .

for government contracting purposes."

In consideration of the $10 million sum, the United states has
agreed to release BCBSF "from any civil monetary claim arising from

BCBSF's participation in the Medicare Part B program as the Florida

Medicare Carrier that the United States has or may have under the

False Claims Act," various other statutes, and under certain common
law theories, that arise "out of the transactions and occurrences
alleged in the Complaint or the Amended Complaint for the period
from December l,
release

1985 through July 9,

1992. 11

~

Id.,

is expressly subject to certain conditions,

3.

The

of course.

Foremost among these is the proviso that BCBSF remains "bound by
27
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all rules or regulations that govern Medicare Part B Carriers" as
long as it is the Florida Medicare Part B Carrier.

Id., ! 6.

In

particular, it is agreed the Settlement Agreement in no way affects
"any obligation to recoup Medicare Secondary Payer overpayments to

private health insurers, or any obligation to account for, collect,
or

any

recoup

overpayment

of

funds

to

Medicare

beneficiaries, their physicians, or other assignees."

providers,
Id.

Additionally, Mr. Cascone testified regarding the settlement
negotiations.

He related they were intense negotiations and

side was hesitant to move.

each

After numerous exchanges and heated

some compromise was made and a settlement was reached

tempers,

after several months.

According to Mr. Cascone, Michael Theis, the

attorney representing the United States, discussed the settlement
negotiations with the Relator's counsel and tried to take their
position

into

position.

consideration,

and

constantly

represented

that

Although Ms. Burr was not present during the settlement

negotiations, Mr. Cascone was concerned her presence would have
prevented a settlement from being reached.

Indeed, he testified

he was reluctant to agree to the $10 million amount ultimately
agreed upon.

In sum, the terms of the Settlement Agreement are fair.

There

~

is every indication from the face of the agreement of the giveand-take that is the mark of an arms-length transaction. { Although

l

Relator is willing to gamble everything on a more favorable outcome
at trial, the mere fact the United States was not willing to make
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that bet does not mean the Settlement Agreement amounts to a sellout on its part.
5.

Eyidenee

ot

Fraud or Collusion

It has been stated "courts respect the integrity of counsel
and presume the absence of rraud or collusion in negotiating the
settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered."

supra, S 11. 51.

Newberg,

As the foregoing findings would indicate, the

cour.t finds no evidence in the record of fraud or collusion in the
negotiation _of the Settlement Agreement herein.

~

Relater has

offered nothing more than her own unsubstantiated suspicions and

innuendo

to

impugn

the

integrity

of

several

very

competent

attorneys and government officials. f Her allegations of fraud and
collusion are rejected as frivolous. 9

6.

Relator's Objections

An important consideration in assessing the fairness of any
class action settlement is the extent and nature of the class
reaction to the proposed settlement.

In re Beef Indus. Antitrust

Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 180 (5th cir. 1979), cert. deniGd sub nom.
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Assoc.,
452 U.S. 905 (1981).

A settlement under the FCA is distinguishable

9

Re la.tor makes much of tha fac;t the United state made its f irat settlement
dQ~and baf0ro Moore and Dunham we~e asked to run th~ir computer sorts to attempt
to document the extent of duplicate payments. However, the United Statea already
had the benefit of Ms. Gibbs' analysis, and the Court ia not convinced it is
inherently unreasonable to explore the possibility of settlement befors expendi.ng
more scarce government resourea9 on damages calculations. Relator's displeasure
with this coursa of action in this case strikes the Court aa nothing more than
a difference of opinion over negotiation strategy. such ie clearly insufficient

to give rise to an inference of collusion.
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from a class action,

however, in that the only individual with

standing to object to the settlement--the relator--is not the real
See United States ex ral. Milam v. University

party in interest.

o~ Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 961 F.2d 46, 48 (4th cir.
1992).

Nevertheless, as a result of the 1986 amendments to the qui

tam provisions of the FCA, the relater has standing to object to
the settlement, which comports with Congress' intent that qui tam
plaintiffs serve as a

cases.

check against government neglect

of FCA

See supra.

With these considerations in mind,

the Court nevertheless

finds, in this case at least, the Relator's objections are not well
taken.

First,

rather

than

propose

an

alternative

range

of

recovery, she simply states, contrary to previous representations
on her behalf, she has insufficient evidence to make any sort of
damages calculation.

Her attorneys gave the United States, through

correspondence, just such an estimate over six months before the
hearing on the

settlement,

permitted by the court.

be~ore she received the discovery

Her plea is particularly unconvincing in

light of the fact more than six months before the hearing, she was
offered access to the computer tapes used by Gerald Dunham and Boyd

Moore in their computer sort, and she refused to accept that offer.
Relator also makes much of what she perceives as deficiencies
in the computer analyses conducted by Terry Gibbs,
Moore.

However, an argument could be made the reliability of these

analyses is immaterial.

a

Dunham and

necessary

If the conduct of formal discovery is not

prerequisite

to

obtaining

court

approval

of

a
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settlement, and it is not, see In re Chicken Antitrust Lltig.,
669 F.2d at 241, then it follows complex and expensive damages
calculations ought not be a prerequisite either.

Indeed, the whola

point of entering into a pretrial settlement is to avoid the costs
associated with preparing for a trial on the merits.
In any event, these analyses do not appear to be as unreliable
as the Relater suggests.

Although Ms. Gibbs testified her data

base contained line items with non-numeric values, this was not
true of every line item.

Moreover, it appears there may be an

innocent explanation for the non-numeric values she found--namely,
that no amount was paid because the claim was processed in January,
and the deductible was not yet satisfied.

Hearing (4/20/94) at

277-78.
Relator's

overstated.

criticism

of

Moore's

analysis

is

similarly

She asserts:

since Moore and Dunham used a very tight match to
identify duplicates . . . their analysis should have

retrieved every original and duplicated claim paid or
denied from November 1988 through March 1990 including
over half of the $884 million or .2, 015, 385 duplicate
claims plus the $700,000 duplicate payments to
beneficiaries • • . and the $9,540,000 duplicates paid
to providers and suppliers rrom November 1988 to March
1990 • • . because dollar values~ were not part of
the match criteria. However, only 3.6 million dollars
in duplicates was captured in the Moore study. Clearly,
this flawed, unscientific study is in no way able to
support ~ settlement, yet proponents rely on it
heavily.
Relator's Memorandum at 25.
stating
original

Moore's

analysis

. . . claim."

Id.

First, Relator is simply wrong in
should

have

retrieved

"every

Moore declared "the computer programs

were developed to ignore the line item with the earliest paid date
31
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on the assumption that the first of severa 1 a-pparent duplicate line
items

would

Plaintiff

be

Exhibit

a

reimbursable

claim

for

on April

1994,

at

properly
12,

filed

20,

services.,,
2

(emphasis

added) .

Second, she fails to mention several facts which may explain

the differences in the numbers.

Moore's analysis did not take into

account claims with the same ICN.

Hearing (4/20/94) at 293-94.

According to BCBSF, it has, as of the data of its supplemental
to

response

one

of

the

interrogatories,

Relator's

approximately $11 million in such duplicate payments.

recouped

In addition,

there was testimony at the hearing regarding instances where the
same payment tape was run twice, resulting in two sets of checks

being cut.

Moore testified the tapes he analyzed would not reflact

these types of overpayments.

Hearing (4/20/94) at 295.

Relater also takes the government to task for not conducting

analyses of hew much loss resulted from the deactivation of audits
and the use of force codes in the header of claims.

However, both

Moore and Dunham testified it would be very costly and vary timeconsuming to write programs that would conduct such analyses.

Hearing (4/20/94} at 335-36, 364-55.

Although Relator implies in

her post-hearing submission such an analysis would be fairly easy
to do, she produced no one at the hearing with the expertise of

Moore or Dunham to contradict their testimony.

Thus, the Court

credits these agents' testimony over Ms. Burr 1 s lay opinion.
Additionally, it is clear turning off or otherwise bypassing

an edit does not automatically produce an overpayment.

Moreover,
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force coding a claim through the system is not per se improper;
any analysis of

thus,

distinguish between:

loss
(l)

to

the

government

would have

to

claims properly processed with force

codes, (2) claims improperly processed with force codes due solely
to mere operator error, and (3) claims processed improperly due to
the deliberate misuse of a force code.

These facts only reinforce

the credibility of the testimony of Moore and Dunham.

Relator's other objections are similarly without substance.

,

In particular, she lists a host of areas for which no analysis of

loss was conducted.

Examination of these areas, however, shows her

complaints are overstated.

First, system downtime and whether

~~e

computer was fully operational when it was brought on line are not
the basis for the Plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit; rather, it

is the actions BCBSF allegedly took in response to the GTEDS
system's problems which are the gravamen of the Amended Complaint.
Second, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that there
were claims deleted which were never re-entered into the computer,

and no loss to the government would result from such deletions in_..:

any event.

1

In addition, any loss to the government from deletions

which were re-entered into the system would be purely in the form

of inflated administrative costs, which, the evidence suggests,
would not necessarily result in greater cost to the government.
Any

net

loss

to the government from these

costs

is probably

negligible when one considers the fact HCFA would have had to pay
interest on many of these claims had they not been deleted and re-

entered.
33
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Third, ~ Rela~or

produced

no

evidence

other

testimony to prove claims were summarily denied.

than

her

l

own

Even if claims

were summarily denied, the only resulting loss to the govornm9nt
would be in the form of inflated administrative costs which, again,

might not be recovered by BCBSF,

and might be less than any

interest the government would have had to pay otherwise.

Fourth,

although recoupment data would show evidence of overpayments, it
appears it would be difficult to distinguish overpayments that were
the result of computer or operator error and those that were the
result of intentional bypassing of audits.

Todd testified the

recoupment data was kept separate and distinct from the processing
data, and was essentially a manual system.
Todd testified he did not investigate Medicare Secondary Payor

issues because there was already an ongoing investigation looking
into that area.

Moreover, the Settlement Agreement specifically

requires BCBSF to continue to recoup MSP overpayments and cooperate
with the Unitad States to resolve these ·issues.
In closing, the Relater asserts "[i)t is insulting to suggest

that the costs of litigation alone could motivate BCBSF to settle

rather than vindicate its reputation through victory at trial if,
as it protests, no wrongdoing occurred."
29.

This statement reflects a

Relator's Memorandum at

lack of awareness of the costs

associated with long, drawn-out· litigation.

In addition to the

financial costs, an organization defending a lawsuit must endure

•

·f

the disruptions attendant to the conduct of modern discovery, and
the resulting impact on morale as employees are diverted from their
34
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ordinary duties to assist in the production of massive sets of
documents, and to appear for deposition or trial.

The effect of
-4

the settlement h~aring on th~ schedules of various employees of

•

BCBSF is a case in point.

Moreover, the organization itself must 1
be concerned with the effects on its reputation of the pendency of
a case in which it is accused of fraudulent activity.
It

is

because

of

these

financial

and

other

costs

that

organizations like BCBSF settle lawsuits for substantial sums even ,
though they vigorously deny liability.

rt in no way stretches

credulity to believe ECBSF would be willing to settle this suit for

$10 million even while expressing confidence in a favorable outcome
at trial :f .,. _.
Conelusion
While the Court has come to the conclusion the settlement

should be approved, it in no way condones or endorses the actions

in which BCBSF admittedly engaged.
settlement

to

circumstances.

be

a

reasonable

The Court simply finds the

outcome

under

all

of

the

Although the proponents' presentations in support

of the settlement had their shortcomings, the court is satisfied
they have met their burden of demonstrating the settlement should

'
,.

be approved.
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RECOMMENDATION

As outlined herein, the undersigned concludes the Settlement
Agreement

is

fair,

circumstances.

adequate,

Accordingly,

and

reasonable

under

all

the

it is recommended the Settlement

Motions (Docs. #66 & 187) be GRANTED, the settlement filed herein
be APPROVED, and this action he DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
!NTEREI>

at Jacksonville, Florida, this

23...J

day of June,

~

1994.

HOWARD

United

ate Judge

Copies to:

The Hon. John H. Moore, II
Chief United States District Judge
counsel of record
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FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COCRT
MIDDLB DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ex rel. THERESA BURR,

St1 JUiJ 23 PH 3: hr:.
GLET,;c ,. i, .·. ·.; ~-;.~:!~f GOURT
:'tlOOLf D::;;:;:~r u :- rLOR/0;',

JAc:~s c::'.:·;_~_::~. r :. .omo,1\

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 91-134-Civ-J-16

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD

OF FLORIDA, INC., a Florida
Corporation,
Defendant.
O

RD

E

R

Relator's Petition to Reopen the Record (Doc. #194), filed on
May 25,

1994,

is DENIED.

The evidence proffered would have no

material bearing on tha recommendation entered on this date.
CONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this

June,

1994.

~~►---

.2~"'

day of

,.J._

HOWARD T. SNYDER
United States Magi
Copies to:

counsel of record
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